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A B S T R A C T
At nearly  million inhabitants, Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country by
twofold and fertility levels remain higher than most other sub-Saharan African
nations. Throughout the last several decades, the fertility gap between
Christians and Muslims has widened with signiﬁcant political implications for
a nascent democracy. Where the DHS survey of  revealed a non-signiﬁcant
difference of · children, this ﬁgure had increased to · children by . As
the total fertility rate (TFR) of Christians decreased signiﬁcantly from · to ·
children per woman between  and , the TFR of Muslims increased
from · to · children per woman. The timing of this divergence coincides
with the formal institutionalization of Sharia law in . We examine the
role of religion on education, contraception and family behaviour. Finally, we
touch upon the implications for population growth and the religious compos-
ition of Nigeria in the coming decades.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
At nearly  million inhabitants, Nigeria is the most populous country
in Africa by twofold and is on course to become one of the largest coun-
tries in the world. It is also one of the most diverse, with a large number
of groups from different linguistic and ethnic backgrounds (Katzner
; Lieberman and McClendon ). Nigeria is also the only state
in the world with equal proportions of Christians (·% in ),
located mainly in the South, and Muslims (·%) (PEW ) who
are living mainly in the Northern regions of the country (Figure ).
The population balance between the two majority religions, however,
is likely to shift in the future as a result of distinctly different trajectories
of demographic change. While the Muslim North is currently in an early
phase of demographic transition with very high fertility rates, fertility
rates of Christians and Muslims in the South are declining as the demo-
graphic transition is further underway. These diverging trajectories in
demographic behaviour may lead to the end of the current equilibrium
between the two religions with signiﬁcant implications for the future of
the country. Within this study we examine possible explanations for di-
vergent population trajectories along religious lines as well as the path
that these trajectories may potentially take into the future.
As with several other Western African countries, ethno-regional and
religious divides largely overlap in Nigeria and are manifested in a pro-
nounced north-south gap (Mancini ). Here, inequalities have
emerged along geographic and ethnic divisions as well as along socio-
economic lines between nomadic herdsmen and farmers, exacerbated
by climate change (e.g. Fasona & Omojola ; Sayne ). While











































ethnic divides were of great importance in the past, a religious divide
now appears to be becoming more pronounced as religious tensions
compound traditional ethnic and geopolitical rivalries, magnifying
underlying insecurities and grievances.
The past decade has seen increasing reports of sectarian violence in
Nigeria’s Middle Belt where ethnic and religious communities meet.
And in an ominous sign of things to come, these attacks are increasingly
framed in terms of religious and cultural conﬂict. In – Sharia
laws were introduced in  states in northern Nigeria (Figure )
leading to religious unrest and an escalation of hostilities that resulted
in thousands of deaths in Kaduna state alone (Barker & Ricardo :
; Ostien & Dekker ). This drastic shift is reﬂected in the Pew
Research Center’s Social Hostilities Index which documented a surge
from · to · on a -point scale between  and  – one of
the highest scores in the world. As part of efforts to establish an
Islamic caliphate, attacks on Christians and moderate Muslims by the
militant group Boko Haram, which translates literally to ‘Western
Forbidden’, may be orchestrated with the goal of stoking religious ten-
sions between the predominately Christian Igbo in the South and
Hausa-Fulani Muslims in the North, with the Yoruba in the West repre-
senting a mix of Christianity and Islam.
Within the context of an ethnically and religiously diverse country















Figure . Religious composition by state in Nigeria in . Shading on the
map indicates presence of Sharia law in states; pie charts represent religious
composition.











































with religion-speciﬁc fertility differentials could carry signiﬁcant political
and economic implications. Indeed, Mazrui () ﬁnds that religious
divisions in sub-Saharan Africa are most likely to lead to conﬂict when
they reinforce underlying ethnic differences, precisely the situation we
now observe in Nigeria. It is particularly important to note that the emer-
gence of militant Islamic sects and possible spread of Sharia law to add-
itional states is potentially a response to the growing north-south gap and
perceived political dominance of the South (Isa ). Indeed, while its
implementation has ignited hostilities particularly in the border states
making up the Middle Belt, Sharia law was being applied to Muslims
in most Northern states long before its formal institutionalization
(Ostien & Dekker ).
In our paper, ﬁrst, we discuss factors contributing to the widening gap
in the fertility differential between Muslims and Christians. Besides the
factors such as contraceptive use and demand for family planning and
differences in marital behaviour that fall within the proximate determi-
nants framework (Bongaarts ), which is a framework highly rele-
vant for understanding of fertility change in sub-Saharan African
context, we discuss differences in educational improvements among
women and changing fertility ideals. We show that religion per se is
not the main driver of stalling fertility among Muslims in Sharia states
as there is signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the reproductive behaviour of
Muslims in Nigeria. We argue that fertility stalls and high population
growth are speciﬁc for Muslims in Sharia states. Therefore, it is not
useful to speak of Nigerian Muslims as a homogeneous group.
The second part of the paper demonstrates the consequences of the
increased fertility gap on the religious landscape of Nigeria. While the
relative similarity in size between Muslims and Christians populations
emerged only during the past  years, Muslims have never been a
clear majority in a united Nigeria (Mi ). This situation may soon
change as we identify an ongoing demographic bifurcation that could
signiﬁcantly alter the religious composition of Africa’s most populous
nation with substantial implications for future population outcomes.
T H E I N C R E A S I N G G A P I N R E L I G I O N - S P E C I F I C F E R T I L I T Y I N
N I G E R I A
Using Demographic Health Survey (DHS) surveys, in this study we iden-
tify religion-based fertility differentials and project potential demo-
graphic futures based on a number of scenarios. We ﬁnd that the total











































fertility rate (TFR) of Christians decreased signiﬁcantly from · [CI:
·–·] to · children [·–·] per woman between  and
 while the TFR of Muslims increased from · [·–·] to · chil-
dren [·–·] (Figure ). However, fertility is not rising among all
Nigerian Muslims. Taking a closer look we ﬁnd that fertility has
increased from · to · children per woman between  and
 among Muslims residing in currently Sharia law states (Table I).
However, among those residing elsewhere fertility declined from ·
to · children per woman. Although this is one child more than the
average for a Christian woman, we show that fertility change unfolds
in a similar way among Christians and Muslims from non-Sharia states.
Interestingly enough, the timing of the divergence in fertility trends
coincides with the formal introduction of Sharia law over the course
of several years following the  return to civil rule and subsequent
reinstatement of constitutional law (Kendhammer ; for an overview
see Oba ; Ostien and Dekker ). This leads to questions regard-
ing how Sharia law or culture speciﬁc to those regions where Sharia law
has been institutionalized fosters high fertility. As discussed in the next
section, we hypothesize that the adoption of Sharia and societal norms
related to its practice sustains high fertility culture and contributes to in-
creasing fertility differentials. The widening gap in fertility by religion
can thus be understood as a result of persistent high fertility and prona-
talist culture among Muslims in Sharia law states contrasted with a pro-
gressing fertility transition among Christians and moderate Muslims
residing in the Southern states.
I S L A M , S H A R I A A N D F A M I L Y B E H A V I O U R
The institutionalization of Sharia law in  northern states beginning in
 and consequent subjugation of the English legal system repre-
sented a return to Islamic primacy which has not been observed since
the pre-colonial period (Ostien & Dekker ). However, the spread
of Sharia law and extended jurisdiction to cover criminal as well as
civil matters was the culmination of gradual and some would argue inev-
itable decline of the system of common law that was imposed on Nigeria
during colonialism (Oba ). Indeed, Sharia law was already being
carried out among Nigerian Muslims in the realm of civil/personal
law prior to ofﬁcial institutionalization (Nmehielle ). The full im-
plementation of Sharia law can thus be viewed as symptomatic of pre-
existing societal preferences as well as emblematic of a nascent











































movement away from Western conceptions of law, education and the
secular state.
While the institutionalization of Sharia law in the northern states oc-
curred relatively recently, Islam has long been an integral aspect of
the religious and political landscape of northern Nigeria, culminating
in the Sokoto Caliphate of the early th century and near total replace-















Figure . Total Fertility Rate among Christians and Muslims in Nigeria in
 and . Thick black lines indicate % conﬁdence intervals.
TA B L E I
Total fertility rates by religion by states in Nigeria in ,
 and .
Year
Sharia law states Non-Sharia law states
NigeriaChristians Muslims Christians Muslims
 * · · · ·
() () () () ()
 · · · · ·
() () () () ()
 · · · · ·
() () () () ()
*Because of the small number of observations it was not possible to calculate TFR for Christians
in Sharia states in .











































this period southern Nigeria was awarded as a protectorate to the British,
resulting in the introduction of English law in the South while a system
of indirect rule (through local proxies) led to a two-tier legal system in
the North which included native/customary law (with elements of
Islamic law) and English law. In contrast with the North, Sharia law
never supplanted customary personal law in the southern states of
Nigeria and southern Muslims have traditionally adhered to tribal
customs in most legal matters (Ostien & Dekker ). Thus, although
customary law in SouthMuslim communities often reﬂects the inﬂuence
of Islamic law, the norms and procedures regulating marital law have
remained uncodiﬁed and thus largely contingent on local customs. In
the North, however, the legal ease and societal norms associated with
marriage and divorce have been identiﬁed as key contributors to high
fertility by motivating women within polygynous marriages to maximize
their number of children in order to prevent divorce and ensure their
share of inheritance (Izugbara & Ezeh ).
Although the Quran does not prohibit birth control in marriage and it
is permitted for a wide range of justiﬁable reasons (Omran ), op-
position to modern contraception and family planning programmes
emerged in some contexts where these are seen as an import from the
West and a deviation from ‘the right path’ (Roudi-Fahimi ). For
these reasons it is not uncommon that family planning programmes
would be politicized in Muslim societies. In this context, strict adherence
to Sharia law could imply a lack of sexual health education and/or sus-
picion toward modern forms of contraception, as well as the relatively
low educational levels among young girls. Mazrui () outlines
several ways in which Islamic fundamentalism can affect fertility such
as distrust of the West, association of contraception with prostitution,
Quran-based fatalistic attitudes regarding procreation, attitudes toward
polygyny and large families, subversion of traditional birth spacing,
and encouragement of a large age gap between husbands and wives.
Within this analysis we will focus primarily on the interplay of Sharia,
education, and family planning and its implications for differential
Christian-Muslim fertility levels.
Sharia law and the implicit societal norms associated with its practice
can inﬂuence fertility levels through a number of indirect and direct
causal avenues including lowered age of marriage as well as outright pro-
hibitions on formal education. While there is variation among differ-
ent schools of thought, puberty marks the age of marriage for young
girls under classical Sharia (Rehman ). In addition to the increased
prevalence of pregnancy and implications for educational attendance,











































child brides are frequently forbidden from attending school or lack the
time to continue their education (Warner ). A low marriage age
thus results in higher fertility by increasing the probability of pregnancy
while impeding access to education that could result in lower fertility
preferences (Westoff et al. ). Disparate age differences are also con-
ducive to patriarchy, resulting in increased male control over contracep-
tive practices and reproductive behaviour which evidence suggests leads
to higher realised fertility (Ezeh et al. ; Isiugo-Abanihe ;
Bankole & Singh ).
Societal norms, patriarchy, and a resistance towards Western
inﬂuence – which are sustained by Sharia law – seem to play a role in
high fertility culture among Muslims in northern Nigeria. High fertility
of Muslims in the Sharia states is coupled with persistently high fertility
ideals (Figure ). In  only about % of Muslim women in Sharia
states were in favour of relatively smaller families (with two to four chil-
dren) while large family ideals remain the norm with % of women
considering at least seven children ideal, and an additional % stated
that they would accept any number of children God grants them.
Fertility ideals did not change much among the Muslim women in
Sharia states between  and . Although more women now
give a numeric response to the question, a fairly stable share of those
who wish to have many children (more than  or ‘any number’) sug-
gests that unlimited fertility and large family ideas are well embedded
in the states that adopted Sharia law.
In contrast, fertility ideals have shifted towards smaller families among
Christians and to a lesser extent also among Muslims in non-Sharia
states. Muslim women residing in non-Sharia states not only have a
lower TFR than those residing in Sharia states, but also differ in their
perception of the ideal number of children, with more citing four chil-
dren as ideal and fewer preferring large families with at least seven chil-
dren. The ideal family size distribution and trend towards preferences
for smaller families among Muslim women residing in non-Sharia
states mimics the pattern of Christian women, although their overall fer-
tility ideals are slightly higher than those of Christian women. The appar-
ent difference between fertility ideals of Muslim women in Sharia and
non-Sharia states calls for more thorough investigation of situation
factors of fertility and deeper understanding of the role of religious
leaders and locally embedded cultural practices that give rise to these
diverging preferences.
The high fertility gap between Muslims and Christians can also be
linked to differences in mean age at marriage and in the practice of

























































polygyny. Our ﬁndings conﬁrm that mean age at ﬁrst marriage remains
very low, at about  years for Muslim women in the Sharia states across
all waves of DHS (–). Muslim women residing in non-Sharia
states marry at about – years, while the mean age at ﬁrst marriage
has increased from  to  years of age among Nigeria’s Christians
during –. We also see a decline in polygyny among
Christians and Muslim women in non-Sharia states (down from %
to % among – year olds during –) while the decline
in polygynous marriages has halted in the Sharia states according to
the  and  DHS. Here the share of women aged – who
are in polygynous union settled at %. Polygyny is conducive to
higher fertility within the Nigerian context where co-wives are com-
pelled to have as many children as possible in order to economically con-
strain the husband’s ability to take a new wife and ensure their portion of
the husband’s inheritance (Izugbara & Ezeh ).
One of the underlying mechanisms behind the changes in reproduct-
ive and marital behaviour is education. As we show in the next section,
education levels among Christian women signiﬁcantly increased, while
education levels among Muslim women in the Sharia states remain
low. Rising education levels, higher contraceptive use and lower
desired fertility may have contributed to declining fertility in the
largely Christian South. Concurrently and potentially in response to
this development, anti-Western attitudes and growing fundamentalism
in the largely Muslim North may have resulted in low education levels,
early marriage age and retention of pronatalist beliefs.
E D U C A T I O N
Educational attainment is conventionally cited in explanations of fertil-
ity differences. Numerous studies cite increasing female educational
Figure . Ideal number of children by religion and residence (%) among
women aged –, in  and .











































attainment as one of the key factors of fertility decline. Can improve-
ments in educational levels explain variation in fertility levels and the
opening gap between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria? As illustrated
in Figure , we observe a widening gap in TFR by religion and also diver-
ging trends over time, with Christian fertility declining and Muslim fer-
tility rising. If trends in education were to explain the fertility gap
between Muslims and Christians, we should observe (a) higher educa-
tional levels of Christians compared with Muslims, and (b) educational
improvement among Christians as opposed to stalling education or even
worsening educational characteristics of Muslim women.
Nigeria has witnessed educational expansion since the s when
primary schooling was made mandatory. Greater enrolment at
primary levels translated into increased completion of secondary and
higher education but this seems to be limited to the majority
Christian and better developed South. As expected, we ﬁnd huge differ-
ences in educational attainment between Muslim and Christian women
in reproductive age (Figure ). In  a mere % of Christian women
aged – had no formal education and a majority attained at least
lower secondary education (%). In contrast, two-thirds of Muslim
women had no formal schooling in  and , a modest improve-















Figure . Educational characteristics of women aged – by religion in
 and .











































Furthermore, the gap in completed mean years of schooling (MYS)
between Christian and Muslim women increased from · to · years
from  to  despite signiﬁcant gains by non-Sharia state
Muslims (Table II). Consistent with the hypothesis of a negative
impact of Sharia culture on female educational improvement, the data
show that this growing rift is driven entirely by stalled educational
gains among Sharia state Muslims, % of which lack any formal
education.
The gap in educational attainment is partly sustained by the persistent
perception of Western education as being anti-Islamic (Csapo ).
Lincove () ﬁnds a signiﬁcant effect of religion on school attend-
ance and Kazeem et al. () show that children from Christian house-
holds are ﬁve times more likely to attend school compared with those
from Muslim households. In particular, female education remains at
very low levels. Studies also suggest that many Muslim parents prefer
their daughters to attend traditional Islamic schools, because it guaran-
tees preserving religious values and traditional female roles
(Ogunjuyigbe & Fadeyi ). Indeed, Adiri et al. () ﬁnd that a
Quranic education is more common than other types of school
among Muslim women (·%).
The expected inverse relationship between education and fertility
(Bongaarts ; Skirbekk ) holds and we ﬁnd that that fertility
T A B L E I I
Mean years of schooling of women – by religion and region in
,  and .
Mean years of schooling
  
Christians · · ·
() () ()
non-Sharia state · · ·
() () ()
Sharia state · · ·
() () ()
Muslims · · ·
() () ()
non-Sharia state · · ·
() () ()
Sharia state · · ·
() () ()
Nigeria · · ·
() () ()











































is lower among the better educated in both religions (Figure ). Among
Christians, those with primary or less education had at least six children
in , while those with at least secondary only have four children.
Between  and , fertility fell by roughly half a child for all edu-
cational groups among Christians. Overall, fertility levels were more
than one child higher among Muslims compared with Christians
within all educational groups. The educational gradient in fertility corre-
sponds to the positive effect of in particular secondary and higher edu-
cation on the use of modern contraceptives (Ejelmi et al. ).
However, TFR rose substantially among Muslims in the period –
. We ﬁnd the most pronounced increase among those with no edu-
cation, a smaller increase for those with at least some primary education,
and stalled fertility among women with at least completed lower second-
ary education. This has taken place in spite of modest improvement in
the educational attainment of Muslim women (Figure ). As can be
seen from Table III, the structural effect of increased education
depressed the fertility of Muslims by −· children per woman.
However, fertility increased by · children per woman once education















Figure . Total fertility rate by education among Christians and Muslims in
Nigeria in  and .











































change among Christians and Muslims (see Appendix A; Retherford &
Thapa ). Decreasing age at entering ﬁrst marriage can lead to a rise
in fertility, however, as we showed earlier the mean age at ﬁrst marriage
stays low at about  years but did not decline either. Therefore, other
factors, such as possible changes in contraceptive use and possibly the
institutionalization of Sharia law, stand behind the increased Muslim fer-
tility in Nigeria.
C O N T R A C E P T I O N
Most extant studies ﬁnd that contraceptive use is more common among
Christian women than Muslim women in Nigeria (Adebowale et al.
). Our analysis reveals that among currently married or co-habiting
Christian and Muslim women in Nigeria, there is an increase in contra-
ceptive practice (either using modern or traditional methods) in non-
Sharia states. Despite this modest increase, only around % of
women of reproductive age use modern contraception (see Table IV)
and contraceptive use in Nigeria is low even by regional standards
(Bongaarts & Casterline ). The shares of women using contracep-
tion are higher among women aged – compared with younger
women.
Differences in contraceptive use are signiﬁcant also between religious
groups. Among Christians, the proportion of currently married women
not using any method to prevent pregnancy has declined from % to
% between  and . The fraction of non-users has also
declined among Muslims in non-Sharia states from % to %. In con-
trast, contraceptive use amongMuslim women in states where Sharia law
has been introduced has remained negligible and a vast majority of
married women do not use any method of birth control. The proportion
of non-users slightly declined towards  among the younger women
TA B L E I I I




TFR change Educational change Fertility change 
Christians · · −· −· −·
Muslims · · · −· ·











































TA B L E I V
Percentage of sexually active married or cohabiting women using no contraceptive method, by religion and
age.
Year
All married women Christians Muslims in Sharia Muslims in non-Sharia
– – – – – – – – – – – –
            
() () () () ( () () () () () () ()
            
() () () () () () () () () () () ()
            

































































aged – years; however, this trend reversed between –,
shortly after Sharia law was introduced. Ejelmi et al. () ﬁnd that re-
ligion remains an important predictor of modern contraceptive use in
north-eastern and north-western Nigeria even after controlling for
number of individual and community level factors.
Further examination of the DHS surveys reveals that women in Sharia
states perceive unmet need for family planning. The proportion of non-
users who intend to use or are unsure about using some method of birth
control in the future has increased among all groups during –,
including Muslim women in Sharia states. The proportion of non-users
who do not intend to use any method of birth control has dropped to
% for Christians and % among Muslims in non-Sharia states in
. However, the decline has halted among Muslim women in
Sharia states in recent years and about % of non-users do not wish
to use any contraception in future, see Table V. According to 
DHS, % of Christian women currently not using contraception and
% of Muslim women in non-Sharia states reported they would like
to use contraception. The situation is very different among Muslim
women in Sharia states, where only % of women below age 
expressed a wish to use birth control, a little more than ·% among
– year olds.
The main reason given for not intending to use any birth control in
the future (by the non-users who do not intend to use any birth
control) has shifted from wanting as many children as possible, which was
the most prominent reason given by the Muslim women from Sharia
states, towards opposition to contraception in the period from  to
, see Table VI. This shift is visible for both Christians and
T A B L E V
Trends in the intentions not to use contraception among the
married women not using any method to prevent pregnancy, by
religion.
Year Christian Muslim non-Sharia Muslim Sharia All married
 % % % %
() () () ()
 % % % %
() () () ()
 % % % %
() () (,) (,)











































Muslims in Sharia states. The growth in opposition to contraception,
from % to % among Christians and % to % among Muslims
may be related to, among other factors, more conservative religious
views that stigmatise modern contraception. A smaller proportion of
the respondents explicitly cited religious prohibition as the main
reason for not using birth control in the future. Religious prohibition
was cited more frequently by Muslims (% in  and % in )
than by Christians where the share actually declined (from % in
 to % in ).
Compared with , more Muslim non-users from Sharia states cited
husband’s opposition to birth control – up from about % to % in
, while Christians saw a stagnation of around %. Due to this
shift towards presumably more direct pressure not to take contracep-
tion, fewer cited disapproval of others as inﬂuential in their decision.
This suggests that both the internalization of attitudes leading to disap-
proval of birth control and social pressure against use may have inten-
siﬁed in Sharia law states. Moreover, this shift is consistent with a
signiﬁcant body of literature documenting the pivotal role male fertility
preferences play on fertility decisions in Nigerian society, particularly
among the Hausa ethnic group predominant in northern Nigeria
T A B L E V I
Attitudes towards contraception among non-users, women aged
– years.
Christians Muslims (Sharia) Total*
     
N =  N =  N =  N =  N =  N = 
Wants as many children as
possible
. . . . . .
Opposed to using
contraception
. . . . . .
respondent opposed . . . . . .
husband opposed . . . . . .
others opposed . . . . . .
Religious prohibition . . . . . .
Attitudes and values-related . . . . . .
Knowledge-related reasons . . . . . .
Method-related reasons . . . . . .
Barriers-related . . . . . .
Other reasons** . . . . . .
Does not know . . . . . .











































(Isiugo-Abanihe ; Bankole & Singh ; Duze & Mohammed
; Izugbara et al. ).
Another difference between all Christian and Muslim non-users in
Sharia states is illustrated in the reason for intention not to use contra-
ception in the future. Here we observe that among Christians the ration-
ale for not intending to use is more frequently related to barriers such as
lack of knowledge or a lack of access to contraception (e.g. due to high
price, no access, or health concerns). The aforementioned reasons have
been increasingly cited by Christian non-users, by about % compared
with about % of Muslims non-users in  (this percentage has not
ﬂuctuated). We assume that respondents citing barriers-related reasons
are not principally opposed to birth control. If so, a larger proportion of
Christian and a smaller proportion of Muslim women would intend to
use some methods of preventing pregnancy if they were better
informed, had ﬁnancial means to buy contraceptives and had (better)
access to facilities offering methods of family planning. Problematic
access to family planning facilities and services may indeed be a
reason why Muslim women in Sharia states who perceive unmet need
have little choice, in particular if reproductive choices are being made
in highly unpredictable context (see Johnson-Hanks et al. ;
Johnson-Hanks ). DHS data on the family planning services
network in Nigeria do not allow for a more detailed analysis. However,
we can conclude that the current opposition to modern contraceptive
use is an important reason not to use birth control for Muslim women
in Sharia states and it is as much embedded in as it sustains high fertility
culture in the region.
P O P U L A T I O N P R O J E C T I O N S
Will Nigeria become a majority Muslim country?
We argue in the previous sections that the institutionalization of Sharia
law has led to persistent high fertility as a result of the protective role it
plays in sustaining a high fertility culture. With a small share of the
Muslim population residing in non-Sharia states, the fertility of Sharia-
state Muslims drives the overall high fertility of Nigerian Muslims. The
lack of convergence in Muslim-Christian fertility differentials will not
only change the religious landscape of Nigeria, but can also affect
overall population growth. If the greater fertility of Muslims is sustained,
this will lead to faster population growth over time, particularly as the
proportion of Muslims grows. However, if fertility rates for both











































Muslims and Christians were to converge and decline, this would imply a
lower population growth in the coming decades. We study the possible
consequences of different fertility trajectories on religious composition
in Nigeria using a demographic projection model that takes into
account differences in fertility, intergenerational transmissions of reli-
gion and age-distribution of religious beliefs (Goujon et al. ;
Hackett et al. a; Stonawski et al. ).Q2
The projection of population by age, sex and religion in Nigeria is
based on the demographic method of multi-state population projec-
tions that is widely accepted by technical demographers (Samir et al.
; Hackett et al. a, b). In order to illustrate the long-term
consequences of fertility differentials by religion on the religious land-
scape of the country, we introduce four scenarios in the period of 
years, from  to . The scenarios only differ in terms of fertility
assumptions (see Figure ):
() in the ﬁrst scenario – Fert(conv) – we assume slow convergence in
fertility between Muslims and Christians from initial levels observed
in  that would lead to the same level and age-pattern for these















Figure . Total fertility rate and fertility gap betweenMuslims and Christians
in Nigeria in – by scenario.











































TFR for the total population follows the UN medium assumptions
(United Nations );
() in the second scenario – Fert(c) – the assumption is that fertil-
ity by religion is constant during the whole projection period. This
we estimate using fertility age-patterns based on the  DHS and
adjust them to meet baseline fertility level from the UN (United
Nations );
() similar to Fert(c) – Fert(c) – fertility is constant but on
the level estimated from the  DHS that are adjusted to be in
line with the UN level in –;
() the last scenario – Fert(o) – is designed to examine how religious
composition would change if there was no difference in fertility
between religious groups, and TFR of total population followed
the UN medium scenario assumptions (United Nations ).
Because of a lack of empirical evidence on religion-speciﬁc mortality, we
assume no mortality difference between religious groups. The course of
change inmortality in – follows the UNmedium assump-
tions. Baseline inﬂow and outﬂow of migrants in Nigeria are calculated
using estimates of international migration bilateral ﬂows (Abel ).
Religion of migrants was estimated using information from the Pew
Research Center’s Faith on the Move project (Connor ). In all scen-
arios we assume religious switching between Christians and Muslims.
Evidence from the Global Attitudes Project of Pew Research Center sug-
gests that around –% of males and –% females (both Muslims
and Christians) convert during their life. We model this explicitly in
the projections by introducing transition rates.
The results from our projection model suggest that constant fertility
levels from the baseline could lead to a dramatic change in population
size in Nigeria. During the coming  years the population size is pro-
jected to increase from million in  to million if relative dif-
ference in fertility by religion is kept constant as observed in  (Fert
(c)), and to  million, if fertility differentials from  is used
(Fert(c)). Fertility following the UN medium trajectory (United
Nations ) leads to  million people by  (Fert(conv) and
Fert(o)). As a result of strong population growth, Nigeria may have
the second largest Christian and fourth largest Muslim population by
 (Hackett et al. a).
In addition to strong overall population growth, it is likely that
Nigeria’s population will undergo signiﬁcant changes in religious











































composition (Figures  and ). A shift away from the current shares
seems inevitable, placing the country on a clear path towards becoming
a majority Muslim country in the coming decades. Even if there were no
differences in fertility between the two religious groups (Fert(o) scen-
ario), the proportion of Christians would decrease from ·% in
 to ·% in , whereas Muslims would gain · percentage
points and for the ﬁrst time in the history of a united Nigeria reach a ma-
jority of ·%. In this scenario the differences in population structure,
migration, and religious switching between Muslims and Christians have
a minor impact on religious composition (Fert(o)).
Several other scenarios suggest a stronger increase in the size of the
Muslim population resulting in a growing majority share of the total
population. If the relative difference in fertility is projected from the
 level, when the differential was small, the proportion of
Christians drops to % and Muslims rise to %. In a situation of
more pronounced and slowly diminishing fertility gap (Fert(conv)),
the share of Muslims increases to almost % of Nigeria’s population
and Christians drops to % in . Finally, the scenario with the
most pronounced fertility gap at the level of the DHS and constant















Figure . Proportion of Christians in Nigeria in – by scenario.











































the Muslim population can reach as much as % whereas Christians
can decline to as little as %. In ,  and  DHS data we
see stable fertility differential between Christians and Muslims and the
data so far do not support the convergence scenario. This does not
mean that convergence is not possible in the future but for the
coming years the share of the Muslim population will likely follow the
Fert(c).
We assume in our scenarios, conservatively, that the fertility differen-
tials between Christians and Muslims could decrease or remain constant
at the baseline level. However, it is also possible that in the future the fer-
tility of Christians will decrease following the demographic transition tra-
jectory and Muslim fertility stagnates at the current level (e.g. due to a
lack of modernisation and sustained high fertility culture). Such a diver-
gence would lead to a far greater share of Muslims in the religious land-
scape of Nigeria – reaching as high as –% by .
C O N C L U S I O N S A N D D I S C U S S I O N
Nigeria is most likely going to become a majority Muslim country in no















Figure . Proportion of Muslims in Nigeria in – by scenario.











































Muslim and Christian fertility quickly converges in the near future.
However, this is not likely to happen given the high fertility ideals, low
prevalence of family planning, and slow educational improvements in
Sharia states. Quite to the contrary, legal implementation of Sharia
may sustain the high fertility culture by preventing modernisation as a
result of opposition towards the Western inﬂuence and increased
desires to preserve cultural differences in respect to the rest of
Nigeria’s population.
In this regard, the institutionalisation of Sharia law should be viewed
as a symptom of societal preferences that have long been present
throughout northern Nigeria. It is likely however that the ongoing nor-
malisation of Sharia law will lead to greater societal pressure to conform
to underlying tenets, thus reinforcing many practices contributing to
higher fertility while forming a bulwark against Western inﬂuences con-
ducive to lower fertility (on normalisation, see e.g. May & Finch ).
In Nigeria we are therefore witnessing the conﬂuence of distinctly pro-
natalist traditions in sub-Saharan Africa (Bongaarts & Casterline )
with a conservative religious ideology, a synthesis which will likely con-
tinue to result in high ideal family size and sustained higher fertility.
Fertility intentions and preferences can be powerful in terms of
shaping behaviour and they can also be important as a marker of how
potentially unrestricted pronatalism penetrates religious and cultural
norms following Sharia. Therefore, high fertility can be seen as an inte-
gral part of the local traditions and institutionalisation of Sharia law may
be seen as a way to preserve local culture. High fertility ideals are a key
aspect of high fertility culture and as we showed earlier more than %
of women in Sharia states prefer large families of  and more children
or ‘any number of children God gives them’. Only % think that four or
fewer children is ideal – this contrasts sharply with declining fertility
ideals throughout the rest of Nigeria. Marriage customs, polygyny and
in particular high divorce rates that result from liberal divorce regula-
tions under Sharia are among other possible factors responsible for sus-
tained high fertility among the majority of Muslims in Nigeria. We could
not empirically investigate these potential inﬂuences due to data limita-
tions, however, existing research supports this interpretation (e.g.
Izugbara & Ezeh ).
Nigeria is an outstanding case due to the uniquely balanced popula-
tion share of the two main religions and the clear divergence in demo-
graphic trends. The high relevance of religion within the Nigerian
context further underscores the usefulness of considering religion in
demographic studies. According to the  Afrobarometer, both











































Muslims and Christians claim that religion is very important in their life
(% of Muslims and % of Christians). Nigerian society is divided
across religious, ethnic and regional lines with a long history of rivalry
between the largely Muslim North and mostly Christian South.
Moreover, religion is the most frequently cited reason of violent
conﬂict in Nigeria besides land disputes, according to Afrobarometer
( and ). Religious conﬂict has intensiﬁed since the time of
the survey; Boko Haram began committing atrocities in  and there-
fore it is likely that religion has become an even more important driver
of political instability.
Our projections show that should this fertility gap remain constant, or
slowly decrease (in the convergence scenario), Nigerian Muslims will
have a clear % majority by , making it one of the largest
Muslim states in the world. However, it is very likely that the gap in fer-
tility can grow even further leading to a higher share of Muslims in
Nigerian society. This discrepancy can ultimately bring signiﬁcant
change to democratic outcomes, redeﬁne the political dynamics
between traditionally comparable religious groups, and potentially call
into question power-sharing agreements such as the rotating presidency.
Indeed, within the context of an ethnically and religiously diverse
country such as Nigeria, a newfound emphasis on religious identity
coupled with religion-speciﬁc fertility differentials could very well be pre-
cursors to future sectarian conﬂict and carry signiﬁcant political and
economic implications for the region and the world.
N O T E S
. Source: Own calculations based on DHS .
. Nigerian States: Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto,
Yobe and Zamfara
. In the  census, which is the earliest reliable data source we found, .% of Nigeria’s total
population was Muslim, .% Animist, and a mere .% Christian. In the – census, the pro-
portion of Muslims rose to .% and in the  census to .% while the share of Christians sur-
passed Animists, most likely due to conversion to other religions (.% of Christians in ). The
share of Muslims grew most quickly in the Northern regions, amounting to about % of the popu-
lation in – and  censuses (Mi : ).
. We base our analysis on Demographic and Health |Surveys , ,  and . DHS
 was excluded because of the data quality issues that include underreporting of recent births in
the order of about % and a sample bias towards more educated women (DHS report ). Thus
the results of the  survey diverge from the trends obtained using the three other waves.
. TFR estimations were done using tfr STATA module (Schoumaker ).
. Christians are comprising % of the population in the northern regions while about % of
Muslims reside in the southern states (DHS ).
. Source: own estimates computed for -year period prior survey based on DHS  and .
. We consider states from north-central, north-east and north-west as northern, and south-east,
south-central and south-west as southern. This division differs from the Sharia, non-Sharia distinction
we introduce later in the text because not all northern states have adopted Sharia.











































. Source: DHS ,  and . Own estimates computed for -year period prior survey.
Number of observations is in brackets. Sharia was introduced as source of civic and criminal law
from . Thus, DHS  indicates results in pre-Sharia law states.
. We refer explicitly to formal education to differentiate from Quranic education that is deeply
rooted in northern Nigeria.
. There is no signiﬁcant change for low fertility ideals and the increase in the preference for –
 and + children can be attributed to the decline in non-numeric responses (any number, God’s
will). This indicates that preference for large families remains stable between the two surveys.
. Source: DHS  and ; Note that DHS  cannot be used due to differently phrased
response options. In  the category ‘God’s will’ was explicitly stated but in  and  it was
removed and non-numeric response is recorded only if numeric is not given after probing. As a result
the fraction of non-numeric responses dropped from more than % to about %.
. Gross enrolment rate (GER) at primary increase from  to % in – and GER at
secondary level rose from  to % (UNESCO – UIS database). GER are not available by regions
but differences in educational attainment point towards nearly universal primary school enrollment
in the majority Christian South.
. Source: DHS  and . Note: MYS stands for mean years of schooling. The indicator was
computed using duration of schooling in single years of the respondents. Secondary and higher edu-
cation means that the person completed at least  years of schooling (lower secondary completed).
. Source: DHS ,  and .
. Source: DHS  and DHS .
. Source: own calculations based on data from DHS  and  computed for -year period
prior survey.
. Source: DHS ,  and .
. Source: DHS ,  and .
. Unfortunately, the question was not asked in DHS .
. Source: DHS  and .
. Part of DHS questionnaire inspecting the presence and kind of family planning facilities in the
proximity of women’s place of residence was discontinued since DHS III () and therefore we
could not address this issue.
. In our article we present results of population projections which present scenarios of possible
future changes of a population when certain assumptions are made about the future trajectories of
demographic processes. In contrast to projections, demographers also build forecasts which aim to
present most probable future development of population using the most realistic assumptions of
demographic processes (for more see Preston et al. ).
. The method is an extension of cohort-component based population projections (Preston et al.
). Rather than projecting only age and sex, this method extrapolates additional dimensions such
as health status, marital status, education, political views – or in this case, religion (e.g. Philipov ;
Rogers ; Stonawski et al. ).
. In our projection we follow the UN World Population Prospects,  rather than  revi-
sion because the  revision is closer to TFR observed in DHS  (. for – compared
with . in DHS). In contrast, the latest  revision assumed fertility stalls in Nigeria at . per
woman in – and also pre-estimate for – is at . children per woman, well above
the DHS  level.
. Note: Fertility gap = TFR(Muslims)–TFR(Christians).
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A P P E N D I X
A. Decomposition method for disentangling fertility change from educational
change.
Two components: () educational change, () fertility change
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where: ASFRa,e (t + h) – age speciﬁc fertility rate at age a and educational
group e at time t + h, wa,e (t + h)- number of females at age a and educa-
tion e at time t + h,Q3
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